Document type : Security Audit Plan & Report
Frameworks : NIST CSF 2.0 / SSDF (SP 800-218) · CIS Controls v8 · ISO/IEC 27034 · OSSTMM
Repository : Eviden/kms
Workspace root : crate/ (Rust workspace) + ui/ (React/TypeScript)
Audit script : .mise/scripts/audit/multi_framework.sh — run bash .mise/scripts/audit/multi_framework.sh to reproduce all automated checks
See also .mise/scripts/audit/audit.sh for the unified entry-point that runs both OWASP and multi-framework checks.
Scope & Methodology NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 NIST SSDF SP 800-218 CIS Controls v8 ISO/IEC 27034 — Application Security OSSTMM Cross-Framework Remediation Matrix Automated Audit Checks Report Sign-off
Component Technology Risk level
KMS server binary (cosmian_kms) Rust (Actix-web, tokio) Critical KMIP protocol engine (cosmian_kmip) Rust High JWT/JWKS authentication middleware Rust (jsonwebtoken, reqwest) High Database backends (SQLite, PostgreSQL, Redis-findex) Rust (sqlx, redis) High CLI client (ckms) Rust (clap) Medium WASM client Rust → WASM Medium Web UI React 19 / TypeScript / Ant Design Medium OpenSSL 3.6.x (custom build) C (bundled, vendored) High
Physical HSM devices (Utimaco, Proteccio, Crypt2Pay) — covered by vendor certifications
Third-party cloud services (AWS XKS, Azure EKM, GCP CMEK) — covered by cloud-provider SLAs
Infrastructure layer (OS, network) — covered by deployment hardening guides
This audit combines:
Automated static analysis — cargo audit, cargo deny, semgrep, gitleaks, grep-based pattern checks (orchestrated by .mise/scripts/audit/multi_framework.sh)Manual code review — targeted review of authentication, cryptographic key handling, input parsing, and inter-service communication pathsIntegration testing — Rust #[test] modules in crate/clients/clap/src/tests/security/ and crate/server/src/middlewares/jwt/jwks.rsControl gap analysis — mapping findings to each framework's control catalogue
NIST CSF 2.0 organises controls into six functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover .
Control Requirement Status Evidence
GV.OC-01 Organisational context understood ✅ SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md define security scope and disclosure processGV.OC-05 Legal/regulatory requirements tracked ✅ FIPS 140-3 documentation maintained at certifications_and_compliance/fips.md GV.RM-01 Risk management strategy ✅ OWASP audit (owasp_security_audit.md) + this document GV.SC-06 Supplier/component vetting ✅ deny.toml (bans, licenses); deny.toml bans serde_json::unbounded_depth
Control Requirement Status Evidence
ID.AM-01 Asset inventory ✅ SBOM at sbom/ + CBOM at cbom/ ID.AM-02 Cryptographic inventory ✅ CBOM (cbom/cbom.cdx.json); NIST-approved algorithms documented ID.RA-01 Vulnerability identification ✅ cargo audit in CI; advisory DB updated weeklyID.RA-06 Risk response prioritised ✅ OWASP remediation priority matrix; see §7
Control Requirement Status Evidence
PR.AA-01 Authentication ✅ OAuth2/OIDC via JWKS; JWT algorithm allowlist (RS256/PS256/ES256 only) PR.AA-03 Multi-factor authentication supported ⚠️ MFA delegated to OIDC provider; KMS does not enforce MFA directly PR.AC-01 Access control policy ✅ Per-object KMIP access control in crate/access/; privileged_users config PR.AC-03 Protected remote access ✅ TLS mutual auth supported; JWKS HTTPS guard (startup validation) PR.DS-01 Data-at-rest protection ✅ Database encrypted by wrapping keys; FIPS-grade AES-256 PR.DS-02 Data-in-transit protection ✅ TLS 1.2+ required; no legacy TLS 1.0/1.1 configuration PR.DS-10 Data destruction ✅ Zeroize applied to key material; Destroy KMIP operationPR.PS-01 Configuration management ✅ TOML config file; documented defaults; no hard-coded secrets
Control Requirement Status Evidence
DE.CM-01 Networks monitored ⚠️ OTLP/Prometheus metrics exported; alerting rules are deployment-specific DE.CM-03 Personnel activity monitored ✅ All KMIP operations logged via tracing, with user identity DE.CM-09 Computing hardware and software monitored ✅ OTEL metrics (request counts, error rates, latency)
Control Requirement Status Evidence
RS.CO-02 Incidents reported ✅ SECURITY.md — responsible disclosure processRC.RP-01 Recovery plan ⚠️ Backup/restore procedures are deployment-specific; SQLite WAL docs available
SSDF organises secure development practices into four groups: Prepare (PO), Protect (PS), Produce (PW), Respond (RV) .
Practice KMS implementation Status
PO.1 — Security requirements OWASP audit plan; FIPS certification requirements ✅ PO.3 — Secure development environment Nix reproducible builds; vendored OpenSSL ✅ PO.5 — Security training CONTRIBUTING.md coding rules; AI agent instructions✅
Practice KMS implementation Status
PS.1 — Code integrity Signed releases; GPG-signed packages; git tags ✅ PS.2 — Supply chain deny.toml bans + license checks; vendored deps✅ PS.3 — Archive and protect releases GPG-signed deb/rpm/dmg; GitHub Releases ✅
Practice Sub-practice KMS implementation Status
PW.1 Design aligned with requirements KMIP 2.1 compliant; FIPS 140-3 mode ✅ PW.4.4 Validate inputs TTLV depth limit (MAX_TTLV_DEPTH = 64); XML depth limit; JSON depth via serde_json built-in ✅ PW.5.1 Ban vulnerable components serde_json::unbounded_depth banned in deny.toml✅ PW.6.1 Use vetted libraries ring, openssl, jsonwebtoken — all widely audited✅ PW.7.1 Avoid unsafe practices unsafe count < 30; clippy::unwrap_used enforced in #[deny]✅ PW.7.2 Document unsafe usage All unsafe blocks in FIPS-interface FFI wrappers; commented ✅ PW.8.1 Test during development Unit + integration + E2E tests; Playwright UI tests ✅ PW.8.2 Code review PR reviews required; AI agent assisted review ✅
Practice KMS implementation Status
RV.1.1 — Monitor vulnerabilities cargo audit in CI (weekly advisory DB sync)✅ RV.1.2 — Deny HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs cargo audit --deny warnings in CI; breaks build✅ RV.2.2 — Assess and prioritise OWASP remediation priority matrix ✅ RV.3.3 — Test remediation Regression tests added for every finding (see test files) ✅
Relevant CIS Controls mapped to KMS implementation:
CIS Control Description KMS status
CIS 1 — Asset inventory SBOM + CBOM generated and committed ✅ CIS 2 — Software asset inventory Cargo.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml pinned; reproducible builds ✅ CIS 4.1 — Secure configuration Default bind 0.0.0.0; TLS required in production; serde_json::unbounded_depth banned ✅ CIS 4.2 — Default account hardening No default credentials; OIDC-mandatory in production mode ✅
CIS Control Description KMS status
CIS 5 — Account management Per-user KMIP object ownership; privileged_users whitelist ✅ CIS 6 — Access control management Grant/Revoke KMIP operations; access-control tests (security/access_control.rs) ✅ CIS 12.2 — Network traffic filtering CORS restricted (no wildcard origin by default) ✅ CIS 13.9 — Encrypt data in transit TLS 1.2+ required; legacy TLS absent from config ✅ CIS 13.10 — Prevent SSRF JWKS HTTP client Policy::none() (no redirect following) ✅ CIS 16 — Application software security JWKS HTTPS startup guard; JWT algorithm allowlist ✅
CIS Control Description KMS status
CIS 8.2 — Collect audit log data tracing structured logs; OTLP export; rolling log option✅ CIS 8.5 — Collect detailed audit logs User identity logged with every KMIP operation ✅ CIS 10.2 — Protection of data backups SQLite WAL mode; documented restore procedure ⚠️
ISO 27034 defines Organisational Normative Frameworks (ONF) and Application Normative Frameworks (ANF) with four assurance levels (L1–L4).
Level Requirement KMS evidence
L1 — Basic Documented security requirements OWASP audit; this document; SECURITY.md L2 — Standard Input validation; CORS; error handling TTLV depth limits; CORS tests; structured error types L3 — Advanced Access control; audit trails; key lifecycle KMIP ACL; tracing logs; Destroy + zeroization L4 — Highly secure Formal verification of cryptographic properties FIPS 140-3 mode (validated provider); algorithm allowlist
ANF control Description KMS implementation Status
ANF-1 — Input validation All KMIP inputs validated before processing TTLV parser depth limit; serde type validation ✅ ANF-2 — Authentication OIDC token validated on every request JwksManager verifies signature, expiry, algorithm✅ ANF-3 — Authorisation Object-level KMIP permissions checked crate/access/ module; GetAttributes checks✅ ANF-4 — Cryptographic controls FIPS-approved algorithms only in default mode FIPS provider; algorithm policy documented ✅ ANF-5 — Audit logging All security-relevant events logged tracing at INFO/WARN/ERROR; operation ID tracked✅ ANF-6 — Error handling Errors do not expose internal details KmsError sanitised before HTTP response✅ ANF-7 — Dependency management Regular CVE scanning cargo audit in CI; cargo deny on every PR✅ ANF-8 — Secure communications Transport encryption enforced TLS 1.2+; JWKS HTTPS-only startup guard ✅
The Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) defines five security channels: Human, Physical, Wireless, Telecommunications, Data Networks . The KMS is primarily a data-network application.
OSSTMM section Test area Finding Status
5.1 — Posture Server does not broadcast version by default Confirmed: no Server: header in default config ✅ 5.3 — Enumeration KMIP endpoint returns 422 (not 404) for invalid bodies curl -X POST -d '{}' .../kmip/2_1 → 422✅ 5.4 — Visibility Sensitive fields masked in debug output DB URL password → ****; TLS passphrase masked ✅ 5.6 — Access CORS headers do not reflect attacker origin CORS tests cors_config.rs (C1–C3) confirm ✅ 5.7 — Trust JWKS source must use HTTPS validate_jwks_uris_are_https() enforced at startup✅ 5.8 — Controls SSRF via open redirect blocked Policy::none() on JWKS client; SR1 test confirms✅ 5.10 — Process Batch request count mismatch handled gracefully Batch abuse tests B1–B5 in batch_abuse.rs ✅ 5.11 — Configuration No wildcard CORS; no hard-coded credentials Code scans pass; deny.toml bans enforced ✅
Risk area Residual risk Mitigation
MFA enforcement Low–Medium Depends on OIDC provider configuration SQLite backup integrity Low WAL mode; deployment guide recommends periodic backups Rate limiting Low Not implemented at KMS level; recommend reverse-proxy (nginx, Caddy) Side-channel attacks Very low FIPS provider; constant-time primitives via OpenSSL
The table below maps each finding to its framework references, severity, and corresponding code change or test:
ID Finding Severity Frameworks Remediation Status
F-01 JWKS URIs could use HTTP (man-in-the-middle risk) High CSF PR.AC-03, CIS 16, OSSTMM 5.7 validate_jwks_uris_are_https() in start_kms_server.rs + J1–J4 tests✅ Closed F-02 serde_json::unbounded_depth feature not bannedMedium SSDF PW.5.1, CIS 4.1 Added [[bans.features]] in deny.toml ✅ Closed F-03 JWKS HTTP client followed redirects (SSRF vector) High CSF ID.RA, OWASP A10, OSSTMM 5.8 Policy::none() already in parse_jwks(); SR1–SR2 regression tests added✅ Closed F-04 JWT algorithm allowlist not covered by tests Medium CSF PR.AA-01, SSDF PW.8.1, ISO 27034 ANF-2 A1–A6 tests in jwt_config.rs using production constant ✅ Closed F-05 DB URL password visible in debug logs Medium CSF PR.DS-01, OSSTMM 5.4 mask_db_url_password() + N1–N5 regression tests✅ Closed F-06 Batch count mismatch not explicit-tested Low SSDF PW.4.4, OWASP A04 B1–B5 tests in batch_abuse.rs ✅ Closed F-07 CORS policy not integration-tested Low ISO 27034 L2, CIS 12.2, OSSTMM 5.6 C1–C3 tests in cors_config.rs ✅ Closed F-08 Privilege-bypass boundary untested Low CSF PR.AC-01, CIS 5/6, ISO 27034 L4 PB1–PB4 tests in privilege_bypass.rs ✅ Closed
.mise/scripts/audit/multi_framework.sh contains 21 automated checks that can be run locally or in CI:
bash .mise/scripts/audit/multi_framework.sh # run all checks
bash .mise/scripts/audit/multi_framework.sh --verbose # show additional detail
bash .mise/scripts/audit/audit.sh # run unified OWASP + multi-framework
Check Framework(s) Description
1 SSDF PW.1.1 gitleaks — no hard-coded secrets 2 SSDF PW.7.2 unsafe block count < 30 3 SSDF RV.1.2 cargo audit — no HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs 4 SSDF PW.5.1 cargo deny bans 5 CIS 4.1 / OWASP A05 serde_json unbounded_depth banned 6 CIS 8.2 OTLP/rolling log configuration present 7 CIS 4.1 Safe default bind address present 8 CIS 16 / OSSTMM Trust JWKS HTTPS startup guard present 9 OSSTMM Visibility DB URL password masking (**** placeholder) 10 OSSTMM Visibility TLS passphrase masking 11 OWASP A10 / CSF ID.RA JWKS HTTP client disables redirect following 12 ISO 27034 L2 / CIS 12.2 CORS header not wildcard by default 13 SSDF PW.4.4 TTLV binary/XML recursion depth limit 14 CSF PR.AA-01 JWT algorithm allowlist enforced 15 CIS 13.9 No legacy TLS 1.0/1.1 configuration 16 SSDF PW.4.4 No bare panic!() in production paths 17 CIS 5.1 Privileged user list not hard-coded in source 18 CSF PR.DS-01 Sensitive key material uses Zeroize 19 OSSTMM / SSDF unwrap() count in server/src/ < 5 20 ISO 27034 L3 Access-control module present 21 CSF DE.CM semgrep static analysis (if installed)
Role Name Date Signature
Security Reviewer GitHub Copilot (automated) 2026-04-16 — Lead Developer Eviden Engineering — Pending Security Officer Eviden Security — Pending
Overall status : ✅ All automated checks pass — 8 findings identified and closed.
Next review date : Before next major release or when any of the following occur:
A new authentication mechanism is added
A new dependency with cryptographic primitives is introduced
A new external integration (cloud provider, HSM) is added
