Runtime Network Security Audit

Scope

This report documents the live runtime security assessment methodology and expected results for the Eviden KMS server. The analysis targets the running server process over the network — complementing static source analysis and multi-framework compliance reports.

Run the analyser with:

bash .mise/scripts/audit/runtime_security.sh \
    --server-url https://HOST:PORT \
    [--cert client.pem] [--key client.key] [--ca ca.pem]

Assessment Architecture

graph TD
    A([Security Analyst]) -->|"runtime_security.sh"| B[Runtime Analyser]
    B --> C[Reachability Probe]
    B --> D[TLS Inspector]
    B --> E[Certificate Chain]
    B --> F[HTTP Headers]
    B --> G[mTLS Verifier]
    B --> H[KMIP Protocol Probes]
    B --> I[Optional: nmap / sslyze / nuclei]

    C --> J[(cbom/runtime/)]
    D --> J
    E --> J
    F --> J
    G --> J
    H --> J
    I --> J

    J --> K[runtime_results.json]
    J --> L[tls_analysis.txt]
    J --> M[certificate.pem]
    J --> N[http_headers.txt]
    J --> O[kmip_probes.json]

Network & Attack Surface Map

graph LR
    subgraph Internet ["Public Internet / Zero-trust network"]
        C1([CLI client])
        C2([Web UI])
        C3([Enterprise app])
        A([Attacker])
    end

    subgraph DMZ ["DMZ / Load Balancer"]
        LB["TLS Termination or passthrough"]
    end

    subgraph KMS ["KMS Server Process"]
        direction TB
        P9998["Port 9998 — HTTPS/KMIP\n(main)"]
        AUTH["Auth middleware\n(JWT / mTLS / API-key)"]
        KMIP_ROUTE["KMIP 2.1 routes"]
        UI_ROUTE["Web UI routes\n/ui/"]
        HEALTH["Health — /version"]
    end

    subgraph DB ["Persistent Storage"]
        SQL[(SQLite / PostgreSQL\nRedis-findex)]
    end

    C1 -- "HTTPS + mTLS / JWT" --> LB
    C2 -- "HTTPS + auth cookie" --> LB
    C3 -- "HTTPS + API key" --> LB
    A -. "scan / probe" .-> LB

    LB --> P9998
    P9998 --> AUTH
    AUTH --> KMIP_ROUTE
    AUTH --> UI_ROUTE
    AUTH --> HEALTH
    KMIP_ROUTE --> SQL

Key attack surfaces

Surface	Exposure	Mitigation
Port 9998 / KMIP endpoint	External	mTLS or JWT, TLS 1.2+ only
Web UI	External	Cookie auth, CSP header
`/version` health endpoint	External	Read-only, no secrets
Server certificate	Public	Auto-renew, SHA-256+, RSA-2048+
Database	Internal only	Not exposed to network

TLS Security Scorecard

graph LR
    S3("SSLv3") -- REJECT --> N1["POODLE — CVE-2014-3566"]
    T10("TLS 1.0") -- REJECT --> N2["BEAST / PCI-DSS deprecated"]
    T11("TLS 1.1") -- REJECT --> N3["Deprecated — RFC 8996"]
    T12("TLS 1.2") -- ACCEPT --> Y1["FIPS 140-3 minimum"]
    T13("TLS 1.3") -- ACCEPT --> Y2["Preferred — PFS enforced"]
    style S3  fill:#ef4444,color:#fff,stroke:#dc2626
    style T10 fill:#ef4444,color:#fff,stroke:#dc2626
    style T11 fill:#f97316,color:#fff,stroke:#ea580c
    style T12 fill:#22c55e,color:#fff,stroke:#16a34a
    style T13 fill:#16a34a,color:#fff,stroke:#15803d
    style N1  fill:#fee2e2,color:#991b1b,stroke:#fca5a5
    style N2  fill:#fee2e2,color:#991b1b,stroke:#fca5a5
    style N3  fill:#ffedd5,color:#9a3412,stroke:#fdba74
    style Y1  fill:#dcfce7,color:#166534,stroke:#86efac
    style Y2  fill:#dcfce7,color:#166534,stroke:#86efac

Protocol	Expected	Reason
SSLv3	❌ Rejected	POODLE attack (CVE-2014-3566)
TLS 1.0	❌ Rejected	BEAST, POODLE, deprecated PCI-DSS 3.2
TLS 1.1	❌ Rejected	Deprecated per RFC 8996
TLS 1.2	✅ Accepted	Minimum for FIPS 140-3
TLS 1.3	✅ Accepted	Preferred — mandatory for new deployments

pie title Accepted Cipher Suites by Category
    "ECDHE-AESGCM (strong)" : 4
    "DHE-AESGCM (PFS)" : 2
    "AES256-SHA256 (compat)" : 1
    "Weak / rejected" : 0

Category	Example Cipher	Status	FIPS 140-3	Forward Secrecy
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384	TLS 1.2 ECDHE	✅ Allowed	✅	✅
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256	TLS 1.2 ECDHE	✅ Allowed	✅	✅
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	TLS 1.3	✅ Allowed	✅	✅
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256	TLS 1.3	✅ Allowed	⚠️ non-FIPS only	✅
NULL / aNULL	Export	❌ Rejected	❌	❌
RC4 / DES / 3DES	Legacy	❌ Rejected	❌	❌
MD5-based	Legacy	❌ Rejected	❌	❌
EXPORT-grade	Legacy	❌ Rejected	❌	❌

sequenceDiagram
    participant C as Client
    participant S as KMS Server (TLS 1.3)
    C->>S: ClientHello (supported protocols, ciphers)
    S-->>C: ServerHello (TLS 1.3, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
    S-->>C: Certificate (RSA-2048 / ECDSA-256, SHA-256 signed)
    S-->>C: CertificateVerify
    S-->>C: Finished
    C->>S: [Optional] Certificate (mTLS)
    C->>S: Finished
    Note over C,S: Symmetric keys derived from ephemeral ECDHE<br/>(Perfect Forward Secrecy)
    C->>S: POST /kmip/2_1 (encrypted)
    S-->>C: KMIP ResponseMessage (encrypted)

Certificate Chain Analysis

graph TB
    ROOT["Root CA\nself-signed or public CA\nKey: RSA-4096 or EC-384\nSig: SHA-256"]
    INTER["Intermediate CA optional\nKey: RSA-2048 or EC-256\nSig: SHA-256 Valid: 3 years"]
    LEAF["KMS Server Certificate\nSAN: kms.example.com\nKey: RSA-2048 or EC-256\nSig: SHA-256 Valid: 1 year max"]
    ROOT --> INTER
    INTER --> LEAF

Certificate requirements

Key algorithm: RSA ≥ 2048 bits or EC ≥ P-256
Signature: SHA-256 minimum (SHA-1 rejected by modern browsers and RFC 9155)
SAN: must match server hostname — bare CN no longer sufficient (RFC 2818)
Expiry: warning at 30 days; auto-renewal recommended (ACME/Let's Encrypt)
OCSP stapling: recommended for client-side revocation checking

HTTP Security Headers

graph LR
    subgraph Required ["Required Headers"]
        HSTS["Strict-Transport-Security\nmax-age=31536000 includeSubDomains"]
        XCTO["X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff"]
    end
    subgraph Recommended ["Recommended Headers"]
        XFO["X-Frame-Options: DENY"]
        CSP["Content-Security-Policy\ndefault-src self"]
        CC["Cache-Control: no-store"]
    end
    subgraph Avoid ["Must not disclose"]
        SRV["Server: omit or generic"]
        CORS_W["CORS wildcard forbidden on KMIP"]
    end

Header	Expected Value	Importance	OWASP
`Strict-Transport-Security`	`max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains`	Required	A05
`X-Content-Type-Options`	`nosniff`	Required	A05
`X-Frame-Options`	`DENY`	Recommended	A05
`Content-Security-Policy`	`default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'`	Recommended	A03
`Cache-Control`	`no-store` on API routes	Recommended	A02
`Server`	Empty or generic	Avoid disclosure	A05
`CORS` on `/kmip/*`	None or restricted origin	Required	A01

mTLS Authentication Model

sequenceDiagram
    participant CLI as ckms CLI
    participant KMS as KMS Server
    participant DB as Database

    CLI->>KMS: TLS ClientHello
    KMS-->>CLI: ServerHello + Certificate
    KMS-->>CLI: CertificateRequest (if mTLS mode)
    CLI->>KMS: Certificate (client cert, signed by trusted CA)
    CLI->>KMS: CertificateVerify
    Note over CLI,KMS: TLS session established
    CLI->>KMS: POST /kmip/2_1 (encrypted TTLV)
    KMS->>KMS: Extract CN from client cert → username
    KMS->>DB: Look up access control for user
    KMS-->>CLI: KMIP Response

Mode	How it works	When to use
mTLS	Client presents X.509 certificate signed by trusted CA	Internal services, CLI tooling
JWT (OAuth2)	Bearer token from Auth0 / Keycloak / OIDC provider	Web UI, end-user access
API key	Shared secret in header	Machine-to-machine, simple integrations
No auth	Disabled — dev/test only (`--auth-type none`)	Local development only

Warning

Never deploy with --auth-type none in production. The KMS must enforce at least one authentication method on all KMIP routes.

# Test mTLS with ckms-generated certs
bash .mise/scripts/audit/runtime_security.sh \
    --server-url https://localhost:9998 \
    --cert test_data/certs/client.crt \
    --key  test_data/certs/client.key \
    --ca   test_data/certs/server_ca.crt

KMIP Protocol Security Probes

flowchart TD
    P1["Empty payload probe\nPOST /kmip/2_1 {}"] -->|"Expected: 400/422"| OK1([PASS])
    P2["Oversized BatchCount\nBatchCount: 99999"] -->|"Expected: 400/422/413"| OK2([PASS])
    P3["SQL injection in UID\n'OR 1=1; DROP TABLE"] -->|"Expected: 400/422/401"| OK3([PASS])
    P4["70 MiB payload\nAbove 64 MiB limit"] -->|"Expected: 400/413"| OK4([PASS])
    P5["Rate limit probe\n10 rapid requests"] -->|"429 expected for excess"| OK5([PASS / INFO])

    style OK1 fill:#22c55e,color:#fff
    style OK2 fill:#22c55e,color:#fff
    style OK3 fill:#22c55e,color:#fff
    style OK4 fill:#22c55e,color:#fff
    style OK5 fill:#84cc16,color:#fff

Probe	Payload	Expected HTTP	Risk if wrong
Empty KMIP request	`{}`	400 or 422	Server crash / 500
OversizedBatchCount	`BatchCount: 99999`	400, 422, or 413	DoS / OOM
SQL injection in UID	`' OR '1'='1'; DROP ...`	400, 422, 401	SQL injection
70 MiB payload	Random bytes	400 or 413	DoS / memory exhaustion
Rapid 10 requests	Empty KMIP	422 (or 429 if rate-limit active)	Brute-force

Threat Model (STRIDE)

mindmap
  root((KMS Server\nAttack Surface))
    Spoofing
      Fake client certificate
      JWT token forgery
      MITM on HTTP
    Tampering
      Replay KMIP request
      Key ID enumeration
      Packet injection
    Repudiation
      Missing audit log
      Log injection
    Information Disclosure
      TLS version downgrade
      Server header leaks version
      Error message leaks DB schema
    Denial of Service
      OversizedBatchCount
      Large payload flood
      TLS session exhaustion
    Elevation of Privilege
      CORS wildcard on KMIP
      JWT scope confusion
      Insecure object ownership

Threat	STRIDE	Mitigation	Status
MITM — weak TLS version	Tampering	TLS 1.2+ enforced; SSLv3/TLS1.0/1.1 rejected	✅ Mitigated
Weak cipher negotiation	Tampering	NULL/RC4/DES/EXPORT rejected by server	✅ Mitigated
Certificate spoofing	Spoofing	mTLS or JWT required; CA pinning optional	✅ Mitigated
SQL injection via UID	Tampering	Parameterised queries in all DB backends	✅ Mitigated
OOM via large batch	DoS	BatchCount validated; payload size limit 64 MiB	✅ Mitigated
Rate-based brute-force	DoS	Rate limiting middleware (configurable)	⚠️ Configurable
Server version disclosure	Info Disclosure	`Server` header suppressed	✅ Mitigated
CORS wildcard on KMIP	Elevation of Privilege	No CORS header on `/kmip/*`	✅ Mitigated
Expired certificate	Spoofing	30-day expiry warning in checker	✅ Monitored
Insecure direct object refs	Elevation of Privilege	Object ownership enforced in DB	✅ Mitigated

Running the Analyser

Prerequisites

# Required (always present on Linux)
openssl version   # ≥ 3.0
curl --version    # ≥ 7.68

# Optional — enable richer analysis when installed
apt-get install nmap                  # port scan + TLS NSE scripts
pip3 install sslyze                   # deep TLS / cert-transparency analysis
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3/cmd/nuclei@latest  # template scanner

Basic run (plain HTTPS)

bash .mise/scripts/audit/runtime_security.sh \
    --server-url https://localhost:9998 \
    --insecure    # skip cert verification on self-signed cert

Full run with mTLS

bash .mise/scripts/audit/runtime_security.sh \
    --server-url https://kms.prod.example.com:9998 \
    --cert  certs/client.crt \
    --key   certs/client.key \
    --ca    certs/ca.crt \
    --report documentation/docs/certifications_and_compliance/audit/runtime_security_audit_latest.md

Output files

cbom/runtime/
├── runtime_results.json   ← machine-readable summary (all checks + status)
├── tls_analysis.txt       ← raw openssl s_client output
├── cert_details.txt       ← openssl x509 -text of server certificate
├── certificate.pem        ← server certificate in PEM format
├── http_headers.txt       ← HTTP response headers
├── mtls_analysis.txt      ← mTLS negotiation log
├── kmip_probes.json       ← KMIP protocol probe results
├── nmap.txt               ← nmap scan (if installed)
├── sslyze.json            ← sslyze report (if installed)
└── nuclei.txt             ← nuclei scan (if installed)

Exit codes

Code	Meaning
`0`	All checks passed
`1`	One or more FAIL findings (critical)
`2`	Tool error (missing required utility or bad arguments)

Integration with CI

Add to .github/workflows/main_base.yml as a post-deploy smoke test:

- name: Runtime Security Scan
  run: |
    bash .mise/scripts/audit/runtime_security.sh \
      --server-url https://localhost:9998 \
      --insecure \
      --report cbom/runtime_security_report.md
  env:
    KMS_URL: https://localhost:9998

Relation to other security reports

Report	Layer	Tool
OWASP Source Audit	Static — source code	`scan_source.py` + `risk_score.py`
Multi-framework Audit	Static — policy compliance	`multi_framework.sh`
Runtime Security Audit (this file)	Dynamic — running server	`runtime_security.sh`

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